Crucial figures in the history of social thought establish "schools." These schools are taken to represent their thought to following generations, and it is by these followers that they are remembered. Or are they? It is our position in the following essay that the members of a sociological school change the founder's thought as much as they faithfully articulate it, and that they change it, moreover, in a manner that can be systematically related to the analytic tensions in the original theoretical position. If Engels reified Marx's positivism and determinism, it is because of the systematic ambiguity in Marx's own writings. If Mauss "cognitivized" Durkheimian theory, it was perhaps to make up for Durkheim's emphasis on moral over cognitive codes. The same is true of the tradition that must be called "Parsonianism," and we shall concentrate here on Parsons' ambiguous legacy to the school that takes his name. ' If a founding theory is, indeed, systematically revised in relation to its own internal contradictions -a revision that is, of course, always strenuously denied by the very parties who are committing it -this raises certain critical questions for the recent sociology of science. Particularly since the publication of Kuhn's work on scientific revolutions (1962) , it has been widely assumed that scientific theories are tightly integrated paradigms, that if one important part of a theory is disproved the entire paradigm will soon be relegated to the dustbin of intellectual history. The corollary to this position, which Kuhn has made explicit only in his later work, is that the carrier group for the paradigm is highly consensual (1970: Postscript) . Finally, Kuhn argues that the scientific change produced by such disproof is revolutionary, that one theory succeeds another in a linear progression. In the following essay, we will contend that each of these Kuhnian postulates -which have gained wide acceptance in contemporary social thought -is, at least for social science, false. Even the most "mature" paradigms are not tightly integrated, nor carrier groups as consensual, as Kuhn claims. Consequently, theoretical shifts are more piecemeal and scientific change less linear than Kuhn proposes.
Indeed, rather than tightly integrated, scientific theories must be seen as composed of a number of different components, each of which is concerned with certain distinctive theoretical problems and each of which, therefore, has a relative autonomy vis-a-vis the other parts of the theory. The most general level is concerned with presuppositions that formulate epistemological positions. Ideological orientations present a cross-cutting dimension oriented to political-evaluational questions. Methodological assumptions -both general and specific -present another independent level of theoretical decision-making, one oriented to empirical practice and toward issues like induction versus deduction. Propositional elements are the most specific level of analysis, summarizing empirical observation without, at the same time, being identified with the empirical world itself; propositions reveal, for example, the 1. There is some controversy over what precisely constitutes a school in science as compared, for example, to a tradition or simply a theoretical tendency. With our use of the term we do not intend to enter into this controversy, for we use it as synonymous with tradition generally defined. Compared to Durkheim, Parsons has not established a school, both because he did not exercise the kind of administrative control over appointments that Durkheim commanded and because he never established a powerful journal to carry on his ideas. On the other hand, by contrast to Weber, Parsons definitely established a coherent group of sociological followers.
theorist's vision of the world as in fundamental equilibrium or conflict. Every theory commits itself to a position on each of these levels of sociological analysis, and the theory's position on any of these levels may be changed independently of its other commitments. It is because of the complexity and relative autonomy of the different levels and components of any scientific theory that neither paradigms nor the groups that carry them are as tightly integrated as Kuhn proposed and, further, that theoretical change is much more uneven and piecemeal than linear and revolutionary.2 Great theories are, in almost every case, fundamentally ambiguous (cf. Alexander, 1980b) . The opposition which they generate -insofar as it is serious rather than trivial -occurs precisely in relationship to the contradictions that these ambiguities create. In championing a part of social reality that a dominant theory has ignored or downplayed, opponents are, unknowingly, setting the theory against itself. With these criticisms in mind, followers revise their theory in order to save it, and they do so by emphasizing aspects of reality that were slighted in the earlier effort. In this way, the original theory is broadened, and it is argued that such revision is perfectly consistent with the founder's own intention. Whether or not it is actually considered to be so consistent by those outside the tradition, is, however, a matter that only intellectual history can decide.
The historical basis for Parsons' synthesis and its permeation of sociological tradition In 1961, Parsons wrote that the "war of the schools" was coming to an end. Between the period of the turn-of-the-century theorists, about whom he had written his first book, and 1935 -shortly before its publication -the "action frame of reference," Parsons believed, had gained an increasingly wide acceptance. The ensuing one-quarter century, during which Parsons had developed his own theory, was a period of "institutionalization and crystallization" of this "action" perspective. What remained for the future of sociology -now that the basic elaboration of "action theory" had been completed -was the codification of available empirical knowledge and the closer integration of general propositions (Parsons, 1961) .
From the standpoint of the current situation, this declaration of scientific self-satisfaction seems decidedly premature, if not positively antiquarian. "Action theory," though far from dead, has been on the defensive since the mid-1960s, and the sociological tradition has never been subject to more conflict and fragmentation. It is ironic that this situation has been generated, in part, because Parsons was himself unsure about what precisely constituted his own theoretical framework. Much more important, however, is a factor that Parsons had always shown a strong tendency to overlook. Insofar as sociology relies heavily upon generalized, non-empirical assumptions, theoretical conflation and division is endemic to the enterprise itself. Still, if unanimity is 2. This model of science and scientific change is elaborated in much more detail in Part I of Contemporary Crisis and Classical Foundations, which is Vol. 1 of my forthcoming book, Theoretical Logic in Sociology (Alexander, 1980a) . The criticisms I am making of Kuhn's position amplify and, I believe, systematize, the reservations that have been expressed by a number of others. See, for example, Lakatos and Musgrave (1970) and Toulmin (1972) . impossible, objectivity is not. We shall try here to assess the nature of Parsons' contribution and the fate of his theory in contemporary sociology.
None of the classical theorists of sociology were able to achieve the kind of analytic synthesis which characterizes Parsons' work at its best. Of course, Parsons had the great advantage of hindsight, and he was determined to capitalize upon what he viewed as the critical problems of classical thought. Parsons took the false starts and partial achievements of his classical predecessors with the utmost seriousness; he utilized them to construct a new analytic framework of his own.
Parsons' new synthesis, however, was stimulated by more than a clear-sighted reading of classical thought. It was rooted also in the course of twentieth-century history itself. As Marxists have long claimed, Marx's theory could have emerged only after economic class conflict actually began to affect the social life of the nineteenth century, a new development that was certainly more visible in the English society of Marx's maturity than in any other nation. Durkheim's focus on the independent importance of the moral community and of social solidarity, similarly, was undoubtedly linked to the way these problems emerged not just in France but throughout Western society, where societal integration became increasingly problematic in the face of rapid industrialization and secularization. Finally, though most peculiar to the German situation, the emergence of powerful, purely political bureaucracies, and the manner in which bureaucratic and party systems helped triangulate the stratification of modern societies were social developments that clearly lay in the background of Weber's thought. 3 Parsons' theoretical synthesis, his analytic differentiation and interrelation of independent systems and levels of action, corresponds to similar deep-rooted historical developments, movements which Parsons well described as growing social differentiation. Moreover, the growing pluralization of the modern social order and the increasing challenge of demands for greater integration and regulation particularly reflect the situation in mid-twentieth century America, the nation where Parsons had spent practically his entire life and which had so often been the subject of his sociological concern. The intensity of this differentiation, indeed, is reflected in the very range of the mutually exclusive characterizations which have been offered for "modern society." Pointing to the economic sphere, theorists find the "affluent society," or, the "industrial society" par excellence (Galbraith, 1958) . Keying to political developments, writers have christened the modern West the "organizational society," the first bureaucratically regulated social life in human history (Presthus, 1962) . To the culturally concerned, the West is the "active society," or the cybernetic society, the first collectivity in which culture, particularly cognitive culture, is not only widely dispersed but systematically incorporated into institutional life (Etzioni, 1968) . Finally, there is the "welfare state," the society which has done away with class conflict and fragmentation by creating the universalistic solidarity of citizenship (Marshall, 1965) . Each of these theoretical formulae assumes the dominance in modern society of a different independent social sphere. Yet the very plausibility of each of them also lays the basis for an alternative theory, which, like Parsons', takes each dimension as an autonomous yet interrelated unit. The most famous analytic expression of this alternative, of course, is Parsons' A-G-I-L theory.
It is precisely such social developments, however, which have created the great strains which critics of modernity have so despaired. With pluralization and secularization, there is the increasing isolation of the self and the emergence of "psychological man," who can respond to his predicament only by retiring to the comfort of the therapeutic (Rieff, 1959; 1966) . Other critics focus on the way modernization has set the social adrift from its moorings in the self, decrying the over-socialized, other directed individual (Riesman, 1950; Whyte, 1956; Marcuse, 1964) . There is, in addition, the cultural critique of the modern condition, whose spokesmen forecast the death of meaning and the vulgarization of culture by mass society (Rosenberg and Manning, 1957). In the face of these mutually exclusive claims for the significance of psychological, social, or cultural strain, it seems likely, once again, that these critical currents should be read more as responses to the tensions produced by a general process of differentiation than taken at face value as evidence of the destructiveness of any single feature of modern life. It is because of the strains introduced by the increasing separation of culture, society, and personality that Parsons' approach to the analytic autonomy of these general action systems -the differentiation of personality, social system, and culture -has struck such a responsive cord. It is the historical meaning of Parsons' synthesis, the way it has captured something of the precarious newness of twentieth-century life, that largely explains its powerful impact on postwar social science, why, despite the vast criticism to which his work has been subject, so much of what he has said has been incorporated into the common sense of contemporary sociology. to extend the range and elaboration of his work. It is these very tensions, in fact, which have structured the course of "Parsonianism." Indeed, as with the major theoretical figures in classical thought, the most effective proof of these strains in Parsons' work is that his followers have tried to revise his theory along the very fault lines we have described. From Parsons' first students to his last, the most creative Parsonians, regardless of personal idiosyncrasy or empirical predilection, have tried to push Parsons' theory in the same directions. First, they have consistently moved to open up the closed, or conflated, aspects of Parsons' theoretical vision, in part merely to establish their own disciplinary expertise in a particular field but in part also to encompass the realistic variations of empirical phenomena. Second, and just as consistently, these students have tried to resolve the ambiguities in Parsons' presuppositional synthesis.
The first generation of Parsonian functionalists came to maturity during the early or middle phases of his work, before his theoretical system was fully developed. As a result, the permutations they introduced cannot be as systematically related to Parsons' theorizing as those of the later generation. The general direction of the revisions is, nonetheless, strikingly apparent. In terms of conflation, Merton ( strain which Parsons' conflationary tendency caused him to overlook.
Several students of the personality system, the other social system boundary to which Parsons devoted attention, pushed his logic in a similar direction. Slater (1961a; 1961b; 1966) , for example, emphasized the disruptions which are inherent in the organization of symbolic internalizations by such a directly affective and organic unit as the personality; it is not surprising, therefore, that Slater approaches the socialized individual as a continuous source of socially-structured strain. Weinstein and Platt (1969; 1973) , similarly, take up Parsons' references to the alienative effects of affective denial, developing the psychological dimension of strain, polarization, and differentiation in a way that Parsons himself never contemplated.
Parsons' students also attacked his tendency to conflate commitment to the interchange model with social equilibrium. Arguing that the completeness of differentiation cannot simply be deduced from the relevance of interchange, students emphasized, increasingly, the "leads and lags" among societal sectors that such uneven development can produce (Vallier, 1971; Smelser, 1971) . Such dislocations have, in fact, been the major focus of most of Eisenstadt's work, and he formulates a series of potential system "contradictions" which are produced, at each stage of historical development, by the possibilities for uneven differentiation among institutional spheres.9
It is particularly in the process of separating the issue of empirical conflict from more general commitments that Parsons' students have, increasingly, focussed on the actions of actual social groups and the ways in which group self-interest both structures and articulates functional exigencies. This attempt to achieve a more group-oriented focus motivated Eisenstadt maintained a much more concrete, group-oriented approach to the issue of functional exchange and systematic conflict. This movement away from formalism and deduction has, finally, been manifest by an increasing tendency to open up Parsons' scheme of historical differentiation to more critical ideological perspectives. A number of second generation students emphasize, in contrast to Parsons himself, the extent to which differentiation has yet to be completed, the drawbacks as well as the benefits of the differentiation already achieved, and the ways in which newly differentiated positions often become the objects of manipulation or the basis for new forms of exploitation. This ambiguous relation of increased efficiency and freedom is most clearly articulated in Eisenstadt's analysis of the first great bureaucratic empires (1963), an argument which has significant implications for any perspective on the differentiation of the modern state. Mayhew (1971) , in an analogous way, focusses on the potential corruption that is generated by independent agencies of social control, particularly the police. Similarly, Lipset (Lipset and Raab, 1970) 12. For other discussions and utilizations of the differentiation concept that are self-consciously more critical than Parsons', see Reuschemeyer (1971) ; also, Alexander (1978; 1979a; 1979b -125, 142-169, 193-233) , who focus principally on the cultural dimension, have been much more careful than Parsons to emphasize the differentiated nature of their contributions and have self-consciously distinguished the multidimensional logic involved in the study of value institutionalization from a more purely hermeneutic approach to cultural patterns.
Conclusion: paradigm revision as breakdown or revivification?
As these revisions and permutations of "Parsonianism" have developed, Parsons' original theoretical synthesis has, in an important sense, certainly been strengthened. Yet, paradoxically, these progressive developments have also broken the synthesis down. Inevitably, Parsons' students have tried to cope with the strains in his work on the basis of their scholarly expertise in particular areas. As they specialize, however, they begin to champion certain elements of the Parsonian synthesis over others. As each action level and societal subsystem is given increased autonomy -to protect it from Parsons' tendency for conflationary and reductionistic closure -the drive for overall synthesis and integration is, correspondingly, sharply reduced. In his emphasis on groups and more conditional exigencies, Smelser devotes much less attention to the social system's cultural environment than to its interpenetration with personality. On the other hand, Eisenstadt, while focussing in a similar way on groups and instrumental action, discusses culture at greater length, but refers to personality variables scarcely at all. Similarly, while differentiating the problem of concrete group solidarity and its tension with the political powers much more sharply than Parsons himself, Shils blurs the divisions between cultural and social systems; he also relies on overly static assumptions about personality. Geertz and Bellah, while providing a much sharper analytic differentiation of culture and social systems than Parsons, only occasionally trace the interrelation of cultural patterns with concrete social and psychological processes.'3 Weinstein and Platt (1973:30-33) , for their part, emphasize the independence of personality, arguing that evolving psychological needs provide an impetus for change overlooked by others in the Parsonian tradition.
Each of these arguments, of course, is made from a position within Parsons' overall synthetic framework; indeed, the innovations introduced by each emphasis stem as much from the way they interpenetrate their analysis with some other functional environment as from the way they allow an element increased autonomy. Still, this process of revision threatens Parsons' synthesis. In the process of these theoretical permutations, new fissures develop. Intra-Parsonian conflicts, like intra-Marxist ones, become as significant as those between Parsonians and those in other theoretical traditions. In fact, these fissures provide opportunities not only for continued internal development and expansion but for new cross-cuttings with other theoretical traditions as well."4 Despite Parsons' enduring impression on the sociological tradition, it is too early to determine the ultimate fate of his theoretical legacy. Perhaps the Parsonian synthesis will break down completely. If so, it will leave a rich inheritance for some future effort at theoretical reconstruction. On the other hand, the openings we have described may lead to the development of a more loosely-defined, less sectarian version of functionalist theory. If paradigms are not tightly integrated and their carrier groups only weakly consensual, theoretical revision will inevitably be an open-ended process.
